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Attribute Demand Equations by
Tenure Type
Theanalysis presented in Chapter 9 is based upon estimates of attribute
demand equations for the pooled sample of owner and renter house-
holds. There are clear statistical and theoretical advantages from pooling
tenure types. The statistical advantages of larger samples and more
variations in both the dependent and the independent variables are fairly
obvious. On theoretical grounds, it can be argued that tenure choice,
although it has independent aspects arising from differences in tax
treatment and from the different relative costs of renting and owning,
may result from household decisions to consume particular configura-
tions of housing attributes.
The argument in its simplest form is that there is no separate
preference or demand for tenure and that tenure choice results from the
decision to purchase particular housing attributes. The pooled analysis
in Chapter 9 implicitly accepts this view of tenure choice.
On the other hand, there are cogent theoretical and statistical
reasons for stratifying households by tenure type in the investigation of
the demand for individual housing attributes. In Chapter 6 we indicate
that the prices of housing attributes differ in the owner and renter
submarkets and that the financial terms on which owner and renter
properties are available varies. Thus, if some bundles of housing attri-
butes are more cheaply or conveniently acquired in fee simple and
others on a rental basis, the pattern of household demand for attributes
determines tenure. But if a preference for tenure exists, or if, as we have
discussed in Appendix C, there are monetary advantages and disadvan-
tages to different tenure arrangements, these considerations would affect
the quantities of the various attributes consumed. There are, in fact,
reasons to believe that differences in the relative costs of various attri-
butes or bundles do exist; for example, the rental provision of high-
density small units may be more competitive with ownership than the
rental provision of low-density single-family units.
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The statistical reasons for stratification are evident from covariance
tests which indicate that the renter and owner samples are drawn from
different populations. This fact should not be overstressed because
acceptance of these tests implies that the individual attribute demand
equations are correctly specified, a rather stringent requirement that is
unlikely to be satisfied.
Ideally, the determinants of tenure choice and the determinants of
other aspects of the demand for housing attributes should be specified
and estimated simultaneously as part of a complete model of the demand
for housing services. We lack the knowledge and, probably, the neces-
sary data to estimate such a model. Still, we suspect that the true
demand relationship includes elements of these two views; the analysis
presented in this appendix complements the discussion in Chapter 9 by
considering the demand for housing attributes separately for owners and
renters. Although both of these attempts to address the multiplicity of
residential housing choices facing consumers are incomplete, the addi-
tional analysis presented in this appendix is highly' consistent with the
discussion in Chapter 9 in all respects and provides further support for
the conclusions in the main text.
Means and standard deviations of these housing attributes are
presented in Table G-1 for the renter and owner subsamples. The means
and standard deviations presented for owner-occupied units in Table G-1
differ from those.presented in Table 8-1, where the statistics were for
single-family detached owner-occupied units only.
It is evident, moreover, from Table G-1 that there are systematic
differences between owner- and renter-occupied properties. Owner-
occupied dweffings are of higher quality and are located in better struc-
tures, are more likely to have hot water and central heating, and are
newer than renter-occupied structures. In addition, owner-occupied
dwellings are nearly two rooms larger than renter-occupied units. They
have more baths on the avPage, and include nearly seven-thousand
square feet of parcel area per dwelling unit as compared to only slightly
more than two-thousand for renter-occupied units. Structures adjacent
to owner-occupied units are, on the average, of better quality than those
adjacent to renter-occupied units, and owner-occupied units are located
on better-quality blocks. Moreover, within the central city at 'least,
neighborhood schools serving owner-occupied structures have slightly
higher achievement levels than those serving rental units, and there are
fewer crimes, on the average, in predominantly owner-occupied neigh-
borhoods. The average rental unit is located in a census tract with a
median level of schooling of 7.9 years, whereas the average owner-
occupied unit is located in a tract with a median schooling level of 8.1
years. The mean percentage white in census tracts where sample owner-Attribute Demand Equations by Tenure Type 359
TABLEG-1







Interior 3.13 .68 4.30 .62
Exterior 2.45 .64 2.85 .87
Newness (year built) 1909 22.30 1920 25.07
Hot water .90 — .98 —
Central heating .68 — .91 —
Dwelling-unit size
Rooms 3.81 1.22 5.71 2.45
Baths 1.02 .28 1.24 .62
First-floor area (00's of sq. ft.) 11.511 12.461 10.75 4.14
Parcel area (00's of sq. ft.) 20.65 18.28 67.98 172.76
Neighborhood attributes
Adjacent units 2.86 .81 3.36 .77
Block face 2.94 .88 3.41 .86
Median schooling 9.06 1.05 9.64 1.36
Percent white 55.89 46.03 75.58 40.73
Miles from CBD 3.49 2.08 5.68 3.56
School quality2 7.88 .57 8.11 .62
Crim& 113.60 83.00 75.82 74.34
Structure type
Single detached .116 .719
Duplex .030 — .018 —
Row house .078 — .014 —
Flat .415 — .183 —
Apartment .281 — .036 —
1Single detached rental units only.
2City sample only.
occupied units are located, is 76 percent, as contrasted to 56 percent for
the sample of renter properties. Sample rental properties are located an
average of 3.5 miles from the CBD, as contrasted to an average of 5.7
miles for owner-occupied properties. These differences are less pro-
nounced than those between the samples of rental units and owner-
occupied single detached units in Table 8-i, but the average characteris-
tics of the two samples are still very different.360 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The distributions of structure types occupied by renters and owners
also differ markedly. Seventy-two percent of owners reside in one-
family units, as contrasted with only 12 percent of renters. Most of the
remaining owner-occupants, 18 percent, live in flats; this leaves less than
7 percent for the remaining structure types. By comparison, nearly 70
percent of renters live in flats or apartments, 42 percent in the former and
28 percent in the latter. Eight percent live in row houses.
DEMANDFOR DWELLING-UNIT QUALITY FOR
OWNERS AND RENTERS
Shownin Table G-2 are ten equations which describe the determi-
nants of demand by renter and owner households for five aspects of
dwelling-unit and structure quality. The imputed attribute prices,
obtained from the value and rent equations, indicate that all five attri-
butes are generally highly valued by St. Louis households. For example,
the additive value equations in Chapter 7 indicate that home buyers pay
$833 for an additional unit of interior quality and $72 for an additional
unit of exterior quality. Hot water and central heating are not included in
the owner equation, but renters must pay $8.60 per month more for a
unit with central heating than for one without it, and $2.78 per month
more for a unit with hot water than for a unit without it. Owner-occupied
structures decline in value by $72 for every additional year of age, and
the monthly outlays for rental units decline by thirty-two cents per
month for each additional year of age.
The results summarized in Table G-2 are consistent with the inter-
pretation of these variables as measures of dwelling-unit quality. House-
hold consumption of interior quality, exterior quality, hot water, central
heating, and newness increases with income, education, and other
household characteristics expected to be positively correlated with the
consumption of more housing quality.
The coefficients of income and education are positive in all ten
dwelling-unit-quality equations included in Table G-2. The estimates
indicate that household consumption of dwelling-unit quality depends
more on the education of the head of the household than on the house-
hold's annual income. The standard deviation of annual income is about
$4,000 in the renter sample and about $6,000 in the owner sample. The
years-of-schooling variable has a standard deviation of about three years
in both samples. Thus, for owners, an increase in income equal to one
standard deviation would be expected to increase the consumption of
interior quality by about .11 units; in contrast, a one standard deviation



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.362 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
consumption of interior quality by .16 units. Similarly, education has a
larger relative impact than income in most of the remaining nine equa-
tions.
The race of the occupant has a much larger effect on the consump-
tion of the five attributes of dwelling-unit quality than either income or
education. For example, the first two equations in Table G-2 indicate
that black renters consume .32 units less of interior quality than similar
white renters, and that black owners consume .39 fewer units of interior
quality than similar white owners. Even larger differences are obtained
for the other'eight equations. Racial differences are particularly pro-
nounced for the hot-water and central-heating equations. Few sample
dwelling units lack these amenities; for example, only 10 percent of the
rental properties lack hot water, but the race coefficient is —.1.
Perspective on the magnitude of race coefficients shown in Table G-
2 can be achieved by comparing them to the income coefficients in the
same equation. The first equation indicates that nearly ten-thousand
dollars in annual income is required to offset the lower consumption of
interior quality by black renters. The second equation indicates that race
has a larger effect on the consumption of interior quality by owners than
twenty-thousand dollars of annual income.
Even larger multiples of annual income are required to achieve
parity between white and black consumption in several of the remaining
attributes. These results provide further support for the view that the
most serious consequence of housing-market discrimination may be to
limit the types and location of housing available to nonwhite households,
and that the lower housing expenditures for black households described
in Chapter 7 result from their inability to acquire high-quality housing in
good neighborhoods.
The coefficients of the several labor-force-status variables, i.e.,
years on current job, retired, none employed, and more than one house-
hold member employed, are also reasonable. Additional years of con-
tinuous employment increase the consumption of housing quality in all
but the hot-water equation for owners, and the coefficients are larger
than their standard errors in all but three equations. Similarly, the re-
tirement variable is positive in all but the hot-water and central-heating
equations for owners. The greater consumption of housing quality by
retired households may be due either to a delayed adjustment in housing
consumption or to more affluence than the current annual income and
education variables reveal. The sign pattern of the unemployment vari-
able is interesting and suggestive. For renters, but not for owners,
unemployment is associated with the consumption of less quality than
would be expected otherwise. These differences are, of course, con-
sistent with the greater moving costs of owners than renters.Attribute Demand Equations by Tenure Type 363
The most interesting results are obtained for the family-size vari-
able. The coefficient of the number of persons has a negative sign in all
ten equations and is larger than its standard error in the first six. These
results are consistent with the pattern of substitution by larger families
hypothesized by Martin David,1 who suggested that households con-
sume more space and less quality as family size increases. Further,
support for this view is provided by the analysis in the next section,
which describes household demand for those attributes that are related
to the size of the dwelling unit and of the parcel.
The six dummy variables which describe the several types of child-
less households trace out a complex pattern of consumption of housing
quality. Few of the coefficients satisfy conventional tests of statistical
significance; therefore, the following observations rely more on general
patterns than on any single coefficient. The overall finding obtained for
these household types is again quite reasonable. For example, the
estimates in Table G-2 indicate that single females consume less interior
quality but more of other types of quality than the reference household
type, i.e., families with children headed by a male less than 45 years of
age. Single males, by comparison, appear to consume less of all kinds of
dwelling-unit quality. The results for couples are quite inconsistent and
suggest little in the way of generalization. The one rather large and
statistically significant (at the .01 level) coefficient indicates that older
home-owning couples consume significantly more exterior quality than
would be predicted on the basis of their income, education, labor-force
attachment, and other characteristics.
DWELLING-UNITAND PARCEL SIZE
Attributedemand equations are presented in Table G-3forfour
variables which measure the size of the dwelling unit and, of the. parcel:
number of rooms, number of baths, first-floor area, and parcel area.
First-floor area, however, is presented only for the owners of single
detached structures. The estimates in Table G-3, although quite consis-
tent among equations, are very different from those which describe
household demand for dwelling-unit and structure quality. For example,
the coefficients of the race dummy are highly significant statistically,
large, and negative in all of the dwelling-unit-quality equations. In the
size equations presented in Table G-3, however, they are generally
small, positive, and not statistically different from zero. Indeed, the only






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Attribute Demand Equations by Tenure Type 365
negative coefficient is obtained for the owners' parcel-area equation.
The marked tendency for black owners to occupy smaller lots (parcel
area averages nearly eight-hundred square feet less than that occupied
by white owners with similar characteristics) results, of course, from
their virtual exclusion from suburban properties.
The effects of family size are a second important dissimilarity
between the dweffing-unit size and quality equations. The coefficients of
number of persons are generally negative and statistically significant in
the dwelling-unit-quality equations. In the size regressions in Table G-3,
however, they are generally positive and statistically significant. Other
regressions, not presented here, which include both the number of
school-age children and the logarithm of the number of persons, indicate
that the consumption of additional rooms is particularly responsive to
increases in the number of school-age children. When age and the
logarithm of the number of persons are included in the equation, the
coefficient of the number of persons has a value of.16 and is only slightly
larger than its standard error, while the coefficient of the number of
school-age children is .26 and has a t ratio of more than five. These
results provide further support for the hypothesis that larger families
make consistent substitutions for residential attributes 'within their hous-
ing budgets.
The first two equations in Table G-3 also indicate that the number of
rooms consumed by households rises with increases in both income and
education. The income coefficient, which is virtually identical in both the
owner and renter equations, indicates that a little more than ten-thou-
sand dollars of additional income is needed to increase household con-
sumption by one room. The education coefficient is only about three-
eighths as large in the renter equation as in the owner equation; and
relative to income, it has a smaller effect on the consumption of addi-
tional rooms than on the consumption of additional quality (Table G-2).
Findings for the number of bathrooms are similar to those for the
number of rooms. Black households seem to consume as many, if'not
more, bathrooms as white households of similar characteristics, and the
number of bathrooms increases with increases in income, education, and
family size. These effects are especially large in the owner equations.
The parcel-area equations generally have low explanatory power
but indicate that parcel area per dwelling unit increases with income; this
income effect is especially pronounced for owners. The most surprising
result is the rather large negative coefficient of the number-of-persons
variable in the owner parcel-area equations. This result may be due to
the exclusion of large black families from the suburbs and to an under-
representation of suburban properties in the sample. In addition, the
owner-occupant sample contains a significant number of multifamily366 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
units with rather small parcel areas. The evidence regarding the average
characteristics of single detached and other owner-occupied units may
indicate that larger families tend to shift to lower-quality housing config-
urations with less parcel area.
DEMANDFOR NEIGHBORHOOD ATTRIBUTES
TableG-4presentsequations which describe household demand for
a rather disparate collection of variables described as neighborhood
attributes. The first two variables measure the physical condition of
adjacent dwelling units and of the block face. The third, median years of
schooling for the census tract in which the sample unit is located,
measures the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood and is
interpreted primarily as an indication of neighborhood status or prestige.
The fourth variable, the percent of the census-tract population that is
white, describes the racial composition of the neighborhood in which the
dwelling unit is located. Its importance hardly needs to be stressed. The
fifth variable, miles from the central business district, is qualitatively
different from the other neighborhood characteristics but has figured
prominently in theories of the urban spatial structure. The last two
variables, school quality and neighborhood crime, are limited to central-
city properties and measure the perceived quality of certain neighbor-
hood services: public schools and public safety.
In general, the neighborhood-quality equations closely resemble
those presented in Table G-2 for dwelling-unit and structure quality. For
example, race has .a strongly negative and statistically significant coeffi-
cient in all ten neighborhood-quality equations. It is also strongly nega-
tive in the two accessibility equations, indicating that, on the average,
black owners and renters live closer to the CBD than white households
of similar characteristics. This identifies a source of demand for central
locations that is only weakly related to accessibility considerations. As
we have discussed in Chapter 3, this entrapped black demand for central
locations has maintained housing prices in central areas and has strongly
affected the pattern of urban development.
Similarly, the equations in Table G-4 indicate that as income and
education increase, both owners and renters choose more prestigious
neighborhoods, where adjacent and nearby structures are maintained in
better condition. The size of the income and education coefficients in the
renter and owner equations are remarkably similar for all three neighbor-
hood-quality measures which are available for the entire sample; i.e.,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Attribute Demand Equations by Tenure Type 369
ing. Moreover, education appears to be more important than income in
determining the household's demand for neighborhood quality. This
result is similar to that obtained for the quality variables which describe
individual properties and different from the results obtained for the size
variables. Higher-income and better-educated households choose better
neighborhood schools and areas lower in crime than those with less
education and income; however, these relationships are much less sharp
than those obtained for the remaining neighborhood-quality variables.
The weaker relationship for the school-quality and crime equations no
doubt results from measurement problems and from the small number of
suburban properties with the safest streets and best schools. The sample
of central-city rental properties is far more representative of the metro-
politan-area rental market than the sample of central-city owner proper-
ties is of the metropolitan-area market for owner-occupied properties.
The more consistent results obtained for renter than for owner house-
holds reflect these sampling problems.
The substitution of size for quality by larger families is also evident
from the neighborhood-quality equations, particularly for renters,
although the relationships are not as pronounced as for dwelling-unit
quality. The coefficients for the number-of-persons variable are negative
in nearly all cases, and most are statistically significant.
The equation for the racial compositon of the neighborhood indi-
cates that none of the variables except race are consistently related to
the racial composition of the neighborhood. This result is hard to
interpret for the pooled race equations; separate black and white equa-
tions provide more information on the relationship.
DEMANDFOR STRUCTURE TYPES
Allof the dependent variables in Table G-5 are binary variables that
assume a value of zero or one. Therefore, as in the ownership and
purchase models in Chapter 5, the coefficients may be interpreted as
differences or changes in the probabilities of living in each structure type
arising from differences or changes in each household characteristic.
Regressions are estimated only by ordinary least-squares in this section,
however. In interpreting the results, it is well to refer to the mean
probabilities of living in each structure type. These are shown in the last
row of Table G-5. In particular, these mean probabilities are usually very
different for owners and renters. For example, 72 percent of owners, but
only 12 percent of renters, live in single detached units.
For the renter single detached equation in Table G-5, the only














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Attribute Demand Equations by Tenure Type 371
indicates that the probability of living in single family units is 2.7
percentage points larger for families with two children than for families
with one child, and an additional 2.1 percentage points larger for families
with three children than for families with two children. The race coeffi-
cient is smaller than its standard error, but its value, —.017,is negative
and is nearly one-sixth of the proportion of renters occupying single
detached units.
In contrast to renters, the equation for owner-occupied single
detached units has several statistically significant coefficients. Not sur-
prisingly, given the findings of the decision-to-own and purchase analy-
ses in Chapters 5 and 6, the estimates in Table G-5 indicate that black
owners are far less likely to live in single detached dwelling units than
are white owners of similar characteristics. According to the equation,
this difference is 17 percentage points. Examination of the owner equa-
tions for the remaining structure types indicates that black owners are
more likely to live in all of the remaining structure types than similar
white households, with no other single structure type accounting for the
difference. Only one other owner equation, that for row houses, has a
statistically significant (greater than .01) race coefficient. Its value of .039
is nearly three times the mean proportion of owner-occupants in row
houses (Table G-5).
The income coefficient in the single detached equation for owners is
positive but small and not statistically significant. The education coeffi-
cient, however, differs from zero at the .01 level and indicates that the
proportion of owners living in single detached units increases by .02 with
each year of additional schooling. The only other statistically significant
coefficient in the owners' single detached equation is for older single
females; they are 17 percentage points less likely to occupy such units.
Examination of the other owner equations indicates that these older
single females distribute themselves among the remaining structure
types.
The renter duplex equation indicates that black renters are some-
what less likely to reside in duplexes than are similarwhite renters. The
coefficient of the race dummy in the renter duplex equation is only —.04,
but the proportion of all renters living in duplexes is only .03. The
difference reflects the fact that duplexes, like single detached units, are
not plentiful in the ghetto. The renter duplex equation indicates that
these units are favored by larger renter families; the coefficient of the
logarithm of the number of persons is .042.
Of the remaining six structure-type equations, only three—the flats
for both renters and owners and the rented apartments—provide hous-
ing for very many households. Flats provide housing for 42 percent of
renter households. The sign of the race coefficient in the rented flats
equation is negative but it is smaller than its standard error. Income,372 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
education, and years on current job. are also negative and of very small
magnitude in the same equation.
Retired renters are .14 less likely to live in flats, and unemployed
households are .16 less likely to live in flats, than the reference house-
hold. Both groups are overrepresented in apartments; and, surprisingly,
retired re.nters show a slight preference for single detached units. Single
young females are also less likely to live in flats than the reference family
unit, the coefficient being —.22(.10 level of significance). The probability
of living in a flat decreases with increases in family size, with a coeffi-
cient of —.11 (.05 significance level). These larger renter families are
more likely to choose single detached and duplex units.
Eighteen percent of the sample of owner-occupants live in flats.
Only two of the coefficients are statistically significant at the .10 level or
better, but the coefficients as a whole trace out a plausible profile of
these resident landlords. They are more likely to be black (the coeffi-
cient, greater than its standard error, is.05), have somewhat lower
incomes and less education (both significant at the .05 level), and have
fewer years on their current job. They are less likely to be retired or
unemployed, and more likely to have additional members in the labor
force (the coefficient is .07, significant at the .10 level).
Apartments are the second most common type of rental accommo-
dation. The probability of living in an apartment increases with income
(.10 level of significance) and with education (.01 level of significance).
Households with retired heads, or without an employed household
member, are more likely to choose apartments, as are all types of single-
member households except older males. The coefficient of family size is
negative and greater than its standard error.
Tabulation of the number of coefficients in each equation that are
significant at the .01 and .05 levels for these stratified attribute demand
equatiOns clearly demonstrates the statistical advantages of the pooled
models reported in Chapter 9 (Table 0-6). For example, in the interior
quality equation, the coefficients of 9 explanatory variables are statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level in the pooled equation, as con-
trasted with 6 in the renter equations and 6 in the owner equations in
Table 0-2. A still greater difference is obtained for the newness equa-
tion. Only 4 coefficients in the renter equation, and only 5 coefficients in
the owner equation, are significantly different from zero at the .01 level;
12 coefficients exceed this level in the pooled equation. Similar results
are obtained for the remaining equations.
The regression coefficients for the race dummy variables within
tenure types provide additional support for the conclusions of Chapter 9.
The consistently negative and highly significant race coefficients in all
demand equations for dwelling-unit quality and amenity and for desira-
ble neighborhood attributes in the stratified models indicate that racialAttribute Demand Equations by Tenure Type 373
TABLEG-6
Number of Significant Coefficients in Attribute Equations for





Dwelling quality and amenity
Interior 6 6 9
Exterior 5 5 7
Newness (year built) 4 5 12
Hot water 4 2 4
Central heating 2 4 3
Size
Number of rooms 5 4 7
Number of baths 3 5 4
Parcelarea 2 3 6
Neighborhood attributes
Adjacent units 3 5 5
Block face 5 5 5
Median schooling 4 7 7
Percent white 3 2 2
Miles from CBD 3 7 5
School quality2 4 3 3
Crime2 4 2 3
Structure type
Single detached 1 3 8
Duplex 0 2 1
Rowhouse 2 1 3
Flat 1 1 3
Apartment 2 1 5
1.01 levelof significance.
2City sample only.
differences in consumption of these attributes are not simply the result of
the systematically lower opportunities for home ownership for black
households documented in Chapters 5 and 6.
Whether black households choose to own or rent, and even if the
home ownership analysis of Chapter 6 were totally wrong, the over-
whelming evidence indicates that black households have systematically
lower levels of consumption of all of the attributes of residential quality
that we have considered than white households of similar income, family
structure, and labor-market characteristics.